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1 
The North Korean nuclear crisis: Four-plus-
two—An idea whose time has come 
PETER VAN NESS 
INTRODUCTION: COMPETING PARADIGMS IN THE NORTH 
KOREAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS 
The six-party negotiations on the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear programs, held in Beijing in August 2003, 
concluded with nothing more than the expectation that the six 
participating nations would meet again—no time or place was 
announced. Meanwhile, North Korea threatened to escalate tensions 
further by testing a nuclear device, while the US remained undecided 
about how to proceed.  
Was anything achieved in the August meetings? Is a peaceful 
solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis possible? If so, what is most 
needed to produce a mutually acceptable conclusion to the crisis? 
First, to have any hope for a successful multilateral negotiation, 
especially on a topic as sensitive as nuclear weapons, it is vitally 
important to have the right parties at the table: not too many, not too 
few. All of those states whose core interests are most directly involved 
must be included, but, at the same time, it is equally important to 
include as few parties as possible because each additional state creates 
one more hurdle to achieving a viable consensus among the 
participants. This important first step was accomplished in Beijing in 
August. The six-country meetings brought together what has been 
labelled the ‘four-plus-two’ (the four major powers, the US, China, 
Russia, and Japan, plus North and South Korea), a formula that has 
been widely discussed in the region ever since Nakayama Taro was 
Japan’s foreign minister in the early 1990s.  
Among the six countries, however, there are deep disagreements 
about what a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem might be 
and how it could best be achieved. Both the United States Adminis-
tration and the North Korean regime have taken such extreme positions 
that a peaceful resolution of the standoff is not possible without outside 
pressure to convince both governments to modify their irreconcilable 
positions.  
But the conceptual divisions among the six are not what one might 
expect. Strangely enough, North Korea and the US tend to understand 
security issues in a similar ‘realist’ way, while the other four, especially 
South Korea and China, are arguing for a very different ‘cooperative 
security’ design. Both the US and the DPRK see the world as in a state 
of anarchy, self-help as the only reliable strategy, and negotiated 
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outcomes as inevitably zero-sum (i.e., I can only gain at your expense). 
By contrast, the other four are proposing an ‘everybody benefits’, win-
win solution. They emphasise the importance of avoiding military 
conflict, and stress the need to maintain existing trade, aid, and 
investment ties—a network of mutual benefit which the DPRK would 
be invited to join.  
Yet, North Korea seems far from considering such a proposal as 
attractive. The DPRK has become convinced that it is now target 
number one on the George W. Bush Administration’s hit list, after 
having been marked as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ in the President’s 
2002 State of the Union address, and identified by name in the US 
Nuclear Posture Review as a potential target for US nuclear attack. The 
US declaration of a right to engage in preemptive war,1 plus its 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have only confirmed the DPRK in 
their strategic judgements. As a result, the DPRK leadership has 
determined that a nuclear capability is its best and perhaps only defence 
against a possible US attack.2 Some analysts believe that the DPRK 
would not willingly give up its nuclear capability under any conditions. 
Within the Bush Administration, there is a parallel, realist debate on 
what to do about the North Korean nuclear programs and the continuing 
DPRK escalation of the confrontation. Should Bush opt for preemption, 
coercive diplomacy, or engagement?  
At present, US policy is a combination of the latter two, focused on 
what is called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a strategy 
designed to pressure North Korea by cutting off any exports of missile 
components or nuclear materials to other countries. Ten other countries 
have signed up in support of the PSI after two meetings, first in Madrid 
 
 
1  Long before the US invasion of Iraq, David Hendrickson argued that what the US was 
proposing to do was not preemption but ‘preventive war’. The United Nations Charter does 
provide for war-making in self-defence, but only in the face of an imminent threat. However, 
the Bush Administration had explicitly shifted US strategic calculations, as articulated by 
Donald Rumsfeld, from a ‘threat-based’ concept to a ‘capabilities-based’ understanding of 
threat. Rumsfeld’s argument was that the US should be prepared to make war against any state 
with the capabilities to do serious harm to the US. This would be ‘preventive war’ not 
‘preemption’. David C. Hendrickson, ‘Toward universal empire: The dangerous quest for 
absolute security’, World Policy Journal, 19(3) 2002, pp. 1–10. Noam Chomsky later entered 
the debate, arguing that what the Bush Administration was doing should not be understood as 
either ‘preemption’ or ‘preventive war’, but rather as what he calls ‘preventative war’—‘the 
use of force to eliminate a contrived threat’. Sydney Morning Herald, 29–30 March 2003, p. 2. 
2  See, for example, Don Kirk, ‘North Korea says publicly it needs a “nuclear deterrence”’, 
International Herald Tribune, 10 June 2003, p. 1. Presumably, Iran is making similar 
calculations. See Anatol Lieven, ‘Dangers of an aggressive US approach to Iran’, Financial 
Times, 8 June 2003; Ray Takeyh, ‘Iran’s nuclear calculations’, World Policy Journal, 20(2) 
2003, pp. 21–8; and David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘Iran, player or rogue?’, Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 59(5) 2003, pp. 52–8.  
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and then in Australia, hosted by the John Howard Government.3 The 
problem with PSI is that none of the three countries that border the 
DPRK (South Korea, China and Russia) have agreed to join, and the 
operational difficulties and international legal implications of trying to 
intercept DPRK flights and to stop North Korean ships in international 
waters are very serious. Nuclear material, which is the greatest concern, 
could easily be transported in a backpack and walked across North 
Korea’s 800 km border with China, as a Japanese diplomat described to 
me recently in Tokyo. That kind of material would be virtually 
impossible to interdict by US and allied military forces without close 
Chinese cooperation. 
A further problem on the US side that must be resolved is that, 
despite occasional assurances given by officials that the US would not 
invade North Korea, at least some of the Bush hardliners are as com-
mitted to ‘regime change’ in North Korea as they are to dismantling the 
DPRK nuclear programs. If there is to be a peaceful resolution of this 
confrontation, the US cannot have both regime change and a non-
nuclear North Korea. As long as North Korea is convinced that Bush is 
determined to overthrow the DPRK government, they will see their 
nuclear capability as their best defence and probably their only 
deterrent. 
The task of finding a peaceful solution is further complicated by the 
fact that some US leaders conceive of the confrontation with North 
Korea as a struggle between good and evil, and continue to make 
personal attacks on Kim Jong Il. The US president’s personal contempt 
for Kim Jong Il is well known—‘I loathe Kim Jong Il’, he told Bob 
Woodward during interviews for Woodward’s book on the invasion of 
Afghanistan.4 More recently, US Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control, John Bolton, denounced Kim Jong Il by name 41 times in a 25-
minute speech in Seoul in July, just when other diplomats were working 
overtime to bring the six countries together for the August six-party 
negotiations.5 Clearly, strong emotions like these, on both sides, 
contribute to the danger of misperception and miscalculation. 
This is where multilateral diplomacy becomes essential. To achieve a 
peaceful outcome, both the US and the DPRK have got to be moved 
 
 
3  Paul O’Sullivan, ‘Chairman’s statement: From Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) meeting 
in Brisbane on 9–10 July’, Special Report, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project, 
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Berkeley, 16 July 2003, 
<www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0336_Sullivan.html>.  
4  Bob Woodward, Bush at war (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 340. Bush described 
his responsibility to Woodward to ‘rid the world of evil’,  p. 67. 
5  James Brooke, ‘Kim Jong Il called a tyrant by US’, International Herald Tribune, 1 August 
2003, p. 1. 
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away from their extreme positions. China and Russia must convince 
North Korea that they are prepared, together with the United States, to 
provide the DPRK with credible security commitments to guarantee the 
DPRK regime against foreign military attack and to help in the econo-
mic modernisation of the country, in return for a verified dismantling of 
their nuclear programs. At the same time, Japan and South Korea, as 
America’s closest allies in the region, will have to convince the Bush 
Administration that they must leave regime change to the Korean 
people. 
Nonetheless, there will also be myriad bilateral problems to 
overcome. Somehow these issues in dispute between two countries 
must be put aside while the six parties seek agreement on how to deal 
with the Korean crisis. For one example, China and Japan disagree 
about a whole range of problems: how to interpret their Second World 
War history, territorial claims over islands in the East China Sea, which 
side will win a pipeline agreement with Moscow to bring much needed 
Russian energy exports their way, American–Japanese cooperation on 
missile defence, Japanese sex tourism in South China, compensation for 
Chinese workers injured when they unearthed Japanese wartime chem-
ical weapons left in China, and more. Meanwhile, however, they enjoy 
a close and cooperative relationship with respect to trade, investment 
and foreign aid. 
Each of the six participating countries also has domestic problems 
that might prove to be obstacles to a successful negotiation. One of the 
most serious is the situation facing South Korean President Roh Moo 
Hyun, in office for less than a year, who has suffered a slump in his 
public approval ratings from 70 per cent to just 20 per cent. He has 
called for an unprecedented referendum on his presidential leadership to 
be held in December. How this problem might be resolved will obvi-
ously have a big impact on Seoul’s role in the six-party negotiations. 
Another serious problem which may have a direct impact on the 
negotiations is the abduction of Japanese citizens in the past by North 
Korea. With respect to this issue, however, China, which has taken the 
lead in hosting the multilateral meetings, has perhaps already set an 
important precedent. During the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) summit meetings in October, China’s President Hu Jintao 
reportedly told Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that the 
kidnap issue was a bilateral matter that should be resolved separately by 
Japan and North Korea.6 If China, as convenor and host of six-party 
negotiations, can insist on keeping bilateral problems off the agenda at 
 
 
6  ‘China rejects helping Japan on kidnappings’, International Herald Tribune, 21 October 2003, 
p. 3. 
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these meetings, that would increase the chances for their success by a 
wide margin. 
Despite the many difficulties facing the six participants, a four-plus-
two security consortium would be the best way both to resolve the 
current crisis and to provide a long-term institutional structure to 
support the strategic stability of Northeast Asia. The participants have 
an opportunity to take advantage of the immediate crisis to create new 
security institutions capable of providing long-term security for a 
historically volatile region. 
THE FOUR-PLUS-TWO CONCEPT 
Four-plus-two is a cooperative security concept that has been discussed 
by analysts in Asia and implemented in so-called Track Two dialogues 
for over a decade. The idea is that the four major powers of Northeast 
Asia (China, Japan, Russia and the United States) should commit 
themselves jointly to guarantee the security of the region and to support 
a peaceful reconciliation between the two states (North and South 
Korea). Four-plus-two is particularly appropriate today both as a basis 
for peacefully resolving the current crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear 
programs and as a foundation for building mutually beneficial economic 
and political cooperation in the future. 
The idea of ‘cooperative security’ arrangements among major powers 
is not new. The US arms control agreements with the former Soviet 
Union are the best example to date of cooperative security in practice. 
The ‘nuclear age’ created new imperatives for the major nuclear 
weapons adversaries to cooperate in order to enhance their own security 
and, most importantly, to avoid a suicidal nuclear war. Once the 
governments of both superpowers realised that their combined nuclear 
arsenals constituted a ticking time-bomb capable of destroying human 
civilisation, a new way of thinking became essential. That realisation, 
sharpened by dangerous confrontations like the Cuban missile crisis of 
1962, led both governments to conclude that it was in their fundamental 
interests to cooperate across their many ideological and material 
differences to reach agreements to control the nuclear arms race and to 
minimise the probability of military confrontations between the two 
nuclear superpowers.  
The ‘cooperative security’ design of a consortium like this is 
unfamiliar to many of the decision-makers who presumably would have 
to be involved to make a four-plus-two institution work. Nevertheless, 
they should be able to identify the very substantial mutual benefits to be 
had for all parties from such an arrangement. The history of Northeast 
Asia shows just how necessary it is to build new security institutions in 
the region.  
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The geopolitics of this area (where China, Russia, Korea and Japan 
come together) has been one of the most volatile in the world. For more 
than 100 years, the countries of the region have been in conflict with 
each other. Today, more than 50 years after the end of the Second World 
War, Russia and Japan still have not concluded a peace agreement, and 
the Korean peninsula remains divided into two states, North and South, 
confronting each other across the demilitarised zone (DMZ) that marks 
the 1953 truce at the end of the Korean War. It is the most militarised 
frontier in the world. 
The current crisis began with North Korea’s reported admission in 
October 2002 to US Assistant Secretary James Kelly that it did indeed 
have a program for enriching uranium which might be used to make 
nuclear weapons. This, in turn, threw Bush Administration plans for 
dealing with the ‘axis of evil’ into a tailspin. Ever since Pyongyang’s 
revelation became public, Washington has been on the defensive, trying 
to explain why it insisted on making war with Iraq, where no evidence 
to date has been brought forward to show that Saddam Hussein had any 
weapons of mass destruction, meanwhile insisting that diplomacy is the 
right way to deal with North Korea. The CIA (Central Intelligence 
Agency) estimates that North Korea probably already has one or two 
nuclear weapons, and at the trilateral meeting in Beijing in April 2003 
(US, DPRK and China), the DPRK representative reportedly told the 
US that indeed it did have nuclear weapons. 
The United States has demanded that the DPRK give up its nuclear 
programs and accept international inspection, while Pyongyang has 
declared that it first wants to negotiate a bilateral security pact with the 
US. While the US refused to negotiate before there was evidence that 
North Korea had moved toward denuclearisation, the DPRK increased 
the pressure through a series of unilateral escalations, including the 
expelling of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors 
and withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  
By a year later, however, it appeared that pressure from the other four 
parties had begun to work on both the DPRK and the US. Pyongyang, 
having earlier refused to meet in a multilateral setting, later agreed, first, 
to participate in the three-party meeting in Beijing in April, and then, 
more important, joined the six-party negotiation in Beijing in August. 
For its part, the United States won its point about insisting on a multi-
lateral meeting, but also began to change its position to meet the North 
Korean demand for a security guarantee in return for giving up its 
nuclear weapons programs. At the APEC summit meetings in Bangkok 
in October 2003, President Bush still rejected the idea of a bilateral 
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security treaty with the DPRK, but proposed instead a five-nation 
security commitment to the DPRK.7  
To describe the four-plus-two idea in more detail, I will first discuss 
the four, and then the two Koreas. 
THE FOUR MAJOR POWERS 
The first steps toward constructing a four-plus-two consortium might  
be the most difficult. Each of the four powers is very different: two 
Asian states, one communist and one capitalist; a former communist 
superpower; and the US hegemon. They each have their own vital 
national priorities. Moreover, they have no previous experience in 
working together in a foursome like this. In the region, their previous 
relationships have typically been confrontational, not cooperative. Most 
often, they have fought wars against each other rather than sought 
opportunities to work together for mutual benefit. 
Yet, what is not widely understood is the fact that the four major 
powers of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Russia and the US), despite 
their many differences, actually agree on a number of key strategic 
priorities in the region. Moreover, they are now more in agreement on 
these fundamental issues than they have ever been before. There are 
good reasons for this. 
First, all four have a substantial stake in maintaining the strategic 
stability of the region. None would benefit from a major destabilising 
crisis. For example, it would not serve any of their interests if military 
conflict broke out again in the region as it did during the Korean War of 
1950–53. Moreover, all four major powers especially value their rela-
tions with South Korea (trade, investment, and so on). More important, 
all four have an even more substantial interest in maintaining and 
developing mutually beneficial relationships with each other—so they 
do not want a Korean problem to pit them against each other.  
With regard to relations between North and South Korea, all four 
powers would probably prefer that Korea remained divided (the status 
quo) because of a variety of different concerns about what a reunified 
Korea might become (for example, for China, a concern that Korea 
might become a US ally; for Japan, that Korea might become a nuclear-
armed, independent state harbouring hostile memories of its colonial 
past under Japanese rule). But a gradually reunifying Korea within a 
regional strategic consortium dominated by the four powers would 
potentially alleviate many of those fears. Moreover, the status quo that 
 
 
7  John Aglionby, ‘Bush offers deal to end N Korea crisis’, Guardian Weekly, 23–29 October 
2003, p. 2. 
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the four preferred was the one before North Korea revealed its nuclear 
programs to Secretary Kelly. Now, they have a potential nuclear 
weapons power to deal with. 
Second, all four are strongly opposed to either Korean state (North or 
South) becoming a nuclear weapons power. Three of the four powers 
(the US, China and Russia) are of course already established nuclear 
weapons powers. None of the three favours nuclear proliferation in 
Northeast Asia, nor would they like to see a nuclear DPRK ignite a 
nuclear arms race. Most particularly, if Japan were to respond by 
deciding to arm itself with nuclear weapons, many analysts believe 
South Korea, Taiwan, and perhaps other Asian countries would follow 
suit. Such a regional nuclear arms race would be likely to destroy the 
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
Finally, apart from those important issues about which they all agree, 
only three of the four major powers (all except the US) are opposed to a 
collapse of the North Korean regime. This is principally because it 
might undermine the strategic stability of the region, but also neigh-
bouring countries fear that tens of thousands of refugees might want to 
seek protection in their countries. Although the US has spoken of 
favouring ‘regime change’ in North Korea, once Washington realised 
what strategic instability a collapse might bring, perhaps the US would 
also prefer maintaining regime stability in the North as part of a 
transitional arrangement for the peninsula.  
One of the major obstacles for the four powers in identifying their 
common interests and acting upon them is the history of the region. 
Northeast Asia has been the cockpit of battles among the powers and 
the two Koreas, time and time again. The Cold War in particular divided 
the region into two competing camps. Moreover, there is a long list of 
earlier conflicts beginning with the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–95, the 
Russo–Japanese War of 1904–05, the Japanese occupation of Korea 
from 1910, the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the Japanese occu-
pation of Manchuria, war between Japan and China 1937–45, the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and war with the US (and in 
the final days of the war with the Soviet Union as well), the Korean War 
1950–53, the Sino–Soviet dispute 1963–76, and the Cold War 1950–89. 
The Korean peninsula today remains divided along Cold War lines, one-
half century after the end of the Korean War in which more than three 
million Koreans died. 
THE TWO KOREAN STATES 
The design proposes that the two existing Korean states would be full 
participants in the process of establishing a security consortium, and 
that upon reunification, the united Korea would become a fifth member 
of a Northeast Asia five-power consortium. Divided since the end of the 
Second World War when American and Soviet forces occupied separate 
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parts of the peninsula, the two Korean states have developed in 
markedly different ways. The DPRK, the last truly Stalinist state, has 
less than half the population of the Democratic Republic of Korea in the 
South, and its per capita GDP is only about seven per cent that of South 
Korea’s, but it maintains the third largest standing army in the world.  
The truce negotiated to end the Korean War in 1953 still marks the 
dividing line between the two Korean states. China withdrew its 
‘volunteers’ from the North years ago, but 37,000 American troops 
remain in the South. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wants to 
relocate US troops further south on the peninsula, or possibly entirely 
out of Korea. The reasons presumably are two: to limit US casualties in 
the event of North Korean military response to a US attack on North 
Korean nuclear facilities; and to increase the pressure on President Roh 
to agree to a hardline US position on the DPRK. 
The United States and North Korea each blame the other for 
violating commitments made under the so-called Agreed Framework, 
the bilateral agreement concluded in 1994 with Bill Clinton’s Adminis-
tration to halt the DPRK’s nuclear program and to keep North Korea 
within the NPT. The Agreed Framework called for the IAEA to verify the 
shutting down of the DPRK’s plutonium-producing Yongbyon reactor in 
exchange for 500,000 metric tons of fuel oil a year until two light-water 
power reactors, to be built by Japan and South Korea, came on line to 
replace the energy that could be produced by the Yongbyon facility. 
Economic and political relations were also to be formalised, and the US 
pledged itself to ‘provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States.’8 
During the last months of the Clinton Administration, accom-
modation with the DPRK had reached new levels. Former President 
Kim Dae Jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ of engaging the North had led to a 
historic summit meeting with Kim Jong-Il in June 2000, and US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had visited Pyongyang, opening 
the possibility that President Clinton might also visit North Korea. But 
all of this came to an end in March 2001 when President Kim met the 
newly-elected President George W. Bush, who indicated his deep 
distrust of engaging with the DPRK. President Bush’s State of the 
Union speech the following January included the infamous ‘axis of evil’ 
charge against Iraq, Iran and North Korea; and the Administration’s 
Nuclear Posture Review, leaked to the press two months later, listed 
North Korea by name as a potential target for US nuclear attack. The 
Administration’s declaration of its strategic doctrine in September 2002, 
 
 
8  Quoted in ‘North Korea’s nuclear program, 2003’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 59(2) 
2003, p. 74. 
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and most importantly its commitment to preemptive war against ‘rogue 
states’, explicitly detailed Washington’s hostile intent.9 
North Korea, however, remained in engagement mode, inviting 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi for an unprecedented meeting in 
Pyongyang in September 2002 at which both sides made new con-
cessions in what appeared to be a major step toward DPRK–Japan 
reconciliation and normalisation of relations. From North Korea’s 
perspective, the visit by Kelly the following month appeared to be 
planned within a similar frame of mind. However, when Kelly provided 
evidence to his hosts of a DPRK uranium enrichment program (quite 
separate from the plutonium facility secured by the IAEA) and the 
North Koreans reportedly acknowledged its existence, charges and 
counter-charges began to fly, each government attacking the other with 
allegations of violations of their earlier agreements.  
The DPRK then escalated the tension while Washington prepared to 
make preemptive war against Iraq, another member of the ‘axis of evil’. 
North Korea expelled the IAEA inspectors and re-started its Yongbyon 
reactor; they withdrew from the NPT and even threatened to withdraw 
from the 1953 Korean War truce agreement; and they confronted a US 
spy plane in international airspace and tested short-range missiles into 
the Sea of Japan. 
Following US military success in overthrowing the Saddam Hussein 
regime in Iraq, North Korea apparently now believes, as mentioned 
earlier, that it is the next target for US preemptive war, and that having 
nuclear weapons (unlike Iraq) is their best deterrent. At a second 
meeting with Kelly under Chinese auspices in April 2003, North Korea 
told Kelly that it had nuclear weapons, but in the same meeting, 
surprisingly offered to do all of the things of greatest concern to the 
United States: abandon its nuclear weapons programs and accept 
independent verification, stop missile exports, and work within a multi-
lateral framework to reach an accommodation. North Korea put all of 
the key issues on the negotiating table. In return, Pyongyang wants a 
formal non-aggression treaty with the US and other substantial eco-
nomic and political concessions.10 
The Bush Administration has said time and again that the DPRK has 
violated the Agreed Framework, and that it will not reward ‘bad 
 
 
  9  Excerpts from the version of the Nuclear Posture Review that was leaked to the press on 15 
March 2002 can be found at <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>. The 
full text of ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’ is available at 
<www.nytimes.com>, 20 September 2002. 
10  Julian Borger and Jonathan Watts, ‘North Korea offers to lift nuclear threat’, Guardian 
Weekly, 1–7 May 2003, p. 1. 
The North Korean nuclear crisis 
Page 11 
 
behaviour’ with concessions. They insist that they will not give in to 
‘nuclear blackmail’ or ‘appease’ North Korea, as they charge Clinton 
did. The Administration says that it seeks a peaceful, diplomatic 
solution to the nuclear crisis, but at the same time it is keeping the 
military option open. The Administration is conflicted: triumphant in its 
military victory over Saddam Hussein, but mindful of the potential 
pitfalls of the upcoming presidential election year—and especially the 
failure in 1992 of Bush senior to win re-election after his own success 
in the first Gulf War.  
Negotiating a multilateral solution to the Korean crisis would benefit 
the Administration by showing the world that preemptive war was not 
its only strategic alternative, and that Washington could negotiate peace 
as well as make war against its adversaries. This might be especially 
important as events in Afghanistan and Iraq play back into the North 
Korean negotiations. The failure of the US to consolidate its victories in 
either country or to capture the top leaders, Saddam Hussein and Osama 
bin Laden, means that the military option for the US against North 
Korea has become increasingly untenable. The aircraft that the US 
would need to make air strikes against the DPRK’s nuclear facilities 
have long been in place, but the United States is now unable to move 
sufficient troops into the region to deal with the kind of counter-attack 
that Pyongyang might launch in response.  
Moreover, the failure to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
or evidence of a pre-war operational link between Al Qaeda and 
Saddam Hussein; the body bags coming home as a result of ten to 
twenty attacks on US forces a day; the sabotage of Iraqi oil pipelines, 
power systems, and water supplies; and the unwillingness of the other 
major powers to provide troops or major financial contributions without 
UN control, taken together, put the Bush Administration on the defen-
sive with respect to considering any new military adventures. In 
addition, escalating costs for both the troops in Iraq and the rebuilding 
of the country have contributed to unprecedented government budget 
deficits while the US economy is experiencing a ‘jobless recovery’. And 
candidates for the Democratic Party nomination for the presidency in 
the 2004 election, like Howard Dean and Wesley Clark, have begun to 
challenge the Administration’s wisdom in their ‘war on terror’. 
A SECURITY CONSORTIUM FOR NORTHEAST ASIA 
What would a security consortium for Northeast Asia actually do, and 
how would it work? 
Four key commitments 
To begin, the member-states of the consortium would have to commit to 
four key points. First, the four major powers would individually and 
jointly agree not to commit aggression against the existing states of 
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North and South Korea (and a reunified Korea once that has been 
achieved). There is no model for such an agreement that I am aware of, 
but the four-power commitments would provide the security that has 
been so lacking for both Korean states since the end of the Second 
World War. It would also meet the highest priority concern of the 
DPRK, as reflected in the demands that it has been making on the 
United States for more than a decade, for a formal non-aggression pact. 
Second, in return, the four major powers would insist on international 
verification to affirm and to sustain the 1992 Joint Declaration of the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, i.e., the joint pledge by North 
and South Korea to maintain themselves nuclear weapons free. 
Assurances that both Korean states remain non-nuclear is the highest 
shared priority among the four major powers. This would require an 
institutionalised inspection regime, to be operated by an international 
organisation like the IAEA. Rose Gottemoeller, an architect of the 
arrangement with the Ukraine to give up their 1,900 nuclear warheads 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has suggested that the Ukrainian 
experience might serve as a model for how to denuclearise the DPRK.11 
Third, the member-states of the consortium would commit them-
selves jointly to maintain the strategic stability of the Northeast Asian 
region—in a way similar to how the United States has served as 
guarantor of stability in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. In turn, 
this strategic cooperation could serve as a foundation for joint develop-
ment projects in the region, like the exploitation of Russian natural gas 
and its transmission through the region. 
Fourth and finally, the four major powers would agree to assist in the 
economic development of North Korea and to support a process of 
gradual reconciliation between North and South as determined by those 
two states. If the major powers could agree on these four points, that 
would suffice to meet the crucial external needs of the two Korean 
states and the region. 
How would the consortium operate? 
In order to adequately guarantee the security of the two Korean states, 
formal institutions would be required: four-plus-two must be much 
more than just ‘a talking shop’. For the first time in the history of the 
region, multilateral security institutions would have to be constructed 
for Northeast Asia: a security consortium or a formal concert of powers. 
It would have one feature in common with the idea of a post-Cold War 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the objective of using a 
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security agreement to stabilise a potentially volatile region; but a key 
difference would be that all the major powers in the region would be 
included—this would not be a pact against any other state. It would help 
to stabilise a region that has been traumatised repeatedly by military 
conflict. A dialogue mechanism alone would not suffice.  
Agreement would first be sought among the four major powers, with 
both South and North Korea invited to participate in the institution-
building. Presumably, South Korea would support the idea with 
enthusiasm. Former President Kim Dae Jung officially endorsed such 
strategic thinking as a part of his ‘sunshine policy’ to the North, and the 
new President Roh has himself called for a ‘structure of peace’ in the 
region. Moon Hayong, Director-General for Policy Planning in the 
Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, also 
emphasised the importance of a multilateral approach in a paper pre-
sented to a Berkeley meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) on 13 March 2003.12 
North Korea may at first oppose the idea, but its opposition should 
not stand as an obstacle to continued negotiations among the four major 
powers. North Korea should at every stage be invited to participate, but 
its possible boycott should not stop forward progress. The DPRK 
should not be permitted to sabotage the process. Once the consortium is 
in place, North Korea would not really have an option to oppose the 
arrangement for two main reasons: first, because the consortium would 
include as members all of its outside supporters; and, second, the com-
mitments made by the consortium would meet the principal security and 
developmental objectives declared by Pyongyang.  
The US is currently trying to pressure each of the other powers, 
especially China, to force North Korea to agree to the US unilateral 
demands. But a cooperative security consortium of all of the relevant 
powers is much more likely to win Pyongyang’s compliance. As 
Hendrik Hertzberg writes in the New Yorker, Washington’s only viable 
option is to rely on the help of the other powers.13 China has emerged as 
the key player in shaping a multilateral solution. 
Even if North Korea were to comply with the present US demands, 
which I think is most unlikely, what about the next time? Because of the 
deep distrust on both sides, it would be very difficult to conclude a 
bilateral US–North Korea agreement to resolve the currrent crisis. 
Equally important, even if such a deal were concluded, it is very 
 
 
12  Moon Hayong, ‘Korean nuclear crisis: Benefits of a multilateral approach’, Special Report, 
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable 
Development, Berkeley, 20 March 2003, <www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0322a%5Fhayong.html>. 
13  New Yorker, 13 January 2003. 
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unlikely that it would be honoured because of the continuing mutual 
distrust. In the end, such a bilateral agreement probably would once 
again come unstuck, like the 1994 Agreed Framework before it. 
What if the four powers disagree? 
Of course, they will often disagree, but once the four states decide to 
join together to build a security institution that can provide substantial 
benefits for all parties, it is very likely that the bases for agreement 
listed above (plus others that they may become aware of in the future) 
will serve as a solid foundation for sustained cooperation. Meanwhile, 
quite separately from their common interests in Northeast Asia, all of 
the four major powers are becoming increasingly interdependent in their 
worldwide economic and political relationships.  
Meetings of the four focused directly on identifying areas of mutual 
agreement also could help to dispel mutual mistrust. For example, 
Japanese distrust of China’s willingness to participate in such a co-
operative venture should prove unwarranted, because the Chinese know 
that a nuclear-armed North Korea would sharply increase the domestic 
pressure in Japan to go nuclear, and as a result, China is likely to be 
more helpful in working for a nuclear-free Korea than many analysts in 
Japan expect. 
When attempting to design a successful multilateral arrangement, 
especially on sensitive security issues, it is vital, as I have argued, to 
include all of those states whose interests are most directly involved, 
because if you leave one of them out, that state will almost inevitably 
view the multilateral agreement as a pact against it. At the same time, 
however, it is important to include as few states as possible, because 
each additional state creates one more hurdle to achieving consensus 
among the member-states of the consortium. Therefore, all six (four-
plus-two) should be parties to the consortium, but probably no others. 
Some commentators, for example, have suggested that Russia could 
be left out. But Russian participation is essential to the success of the 
consortium for several reasons.14 If Moscow were excluded, not only 
might the Russians begin to think that the consortium was somehow 
being designed contrary to its interests and therefore try to sabotage it, 
but also the DPRK might try to play Russia against the others to 
obstruct the formation of a working consensus within the consortium. 
On the other hand, if a four-plus-two solution is reached, the consortium 
members will probably want to obtain United Nations sanction, and 
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Russia could help facilitate that endorsement by means of its role as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council. Finally, Russian par-
ticipation is central to achieving multilateral cooperation for the 
development and transmission of energy resources in the region. This 
kind of economic cooperation can benefit all parties and could serve as 
a major foundation stone for political and strategic cooperation in 
Northeast Asia. 
A role for the United Nations? 
The United Nations would not be an ideal site for constructing a four-
plus-two consortium. Trying to achieve consensus in the context of the 
UN Security Council would be likely to make things more, rather than 
less, difficult because Japan is not a permanent member, and the UK 
and France, who are, would want to put their particular stamp on the 
outcome. It would be difficult enough to achieve agreement among the 
six parties without including the two European UN Security Council 
permanent members whose interests in Northeast Asia are relatively 
remote. However, UN Security Council endorsement of the consortium 
should be sought after it was formed and tested, in order to affirm and 
strengthen its legitimacy. It will be vital that the six participants remain 
focused on those key objectives and interests about which they agree, and 
not be diverted into tangential disputes about their disagreements—which 
raises the question about whether an independent facilitator might help 
in the search for consensus among the six parties.  
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is probably the only person in the 
world who might have both the stature and independence needed to 
perform such a facilitating role. Without some sort of independent 
convenor, the initial meetings to build consensus among the four, much 
less the six, might easily deteriorate into arguments about their disagree-
ments rather than their common interests. Also the US superpower 
might attempt to intimidate the others into accepting its particular 
unilateral view which simply would not work. Maurice Strong, the 
Secretary-General’s personal representative, has already made trips to 
Pyongyang, to assist in the effort to find a peaceful solution.15 
While Pyongyang says that it only wants to talk to the US, Bush 
insists on a multilateral approach. Yet both a bilateral US–DPRK agree-
ment and a multilateral arrangement might serve together as component 
parts of a four-plus-two solution. The US–DPRK non-aggression pact 
that Pyongyang has demanded might turn out to be a necessary (but by 
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no means a sufficient) condition for achieving a successful four-plus-
two arrangement for the region. At best, however, a bilateral US–DPRK 
agreement alone is unlikely to provide a durable resolution to the deep 
problems of strategic volatility in Northeast Asia because of the deep 
distrust between the two governments and the history of conflict in the 
region.  
Economic agreements among the six countries for the exploitation 
and delivery of energy resources could provide another foundation 
stone for a successful Northeast Asian security consortium. Selig 
Harrison shows how ‘American encouragement of regional cooperation 
could make a difference’ in helping the countries of the region conclude 
mutually beneficial deals to exploit natural gas resources in Russia and 
to deliver it through pipelines to markets in China, Korea, Japan, and 
beyond. Russia has the world’s largest gas reserves, but it needs capital 
to develop them. Constructing gas pipelines through the DPRK and 
extending the Trans-Siberian Railroad from Russia through to South 
Korea would help to bind the countries of Northeast Asia together in 
ties of mutual benefit and common interests.16  
THE IMPORTANCE OF A MULTILATERAL SOLUTION 
Bilateral approaches to resolving strategic differences with the DPRK to 
date have failed. The Agreed Framework, which was essentially a  
US–DPRK arrangement (although other countries were involved) has 
collapsed, and that precedent is now explicitly rejected by the Bush 
Administration in its own approach to North Korea. Earlier initiatives 
by both South Korea and Japan have also backfired. Kim Dae Jung’s 
‘sunshine policy’, and his courageous attempt to resolve North/South 
differences through personal diplomacy with Kim Jong Il, failed after 
their first meeting in Pyongyang in June 2000, the victim of charges that 
Seoul had to pay the North US$500 million up front to convince Kim 
Jong Il to meet. Two years later, in September 2002, Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi made another attempt to resolve historical differences 
with the DPRK through summit diplomacy, but his effort also failed 
when the problem of Japanese who had been kidnapped years before by 
North Korea to serve Pyongyang’s spying operation became an 
explosive domestic issue in Japan.  
Kim Jong Il may well have made the admission to Koizumi about the 
kidnapped Japanese citizens as one way to reciprocate the Japanese 
Prime Minister’s good will in making the visit; but subsequent charges 
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and counter-charges about how many Japanese had actually been 
kidnapped, what had happened to those few that Pyongyang acknow-
ledged having taken, and a tug-of-war over the five Japanese who 
returned to Japan from North Korea, all poisoned the earlier good will. 
It is very likely that Pyongyang’s acknowledgement about a uranium 
enrichment program to US Secretary Kelly the next month during 
Kelly’s visit to North Korea (and before the kidnapping problem had 
become a huge issue in Japan) was also made by the North Korean 
leaders in a similar spirit of good will; but this also failed, as we have 
seen. 
In light of the failure of these bilateral attempts to resolve strategic 
issues with Pyongyang, there are three main reasons why a multilateral 
solution is essential.  
First, as mentioned earlier, both the United States and the North 
Korean regime have taken such extreme positions that a peaceful 
resolution of the standoff is not possible without outside pressure to 
convince both governments to modify their irreconcilable positions—to 
bring the two ‘realist’ states into the ‘cooperative security’ solution. If 
they were left to themselves, their ‘zero-sum’ perspectives would be 
most likely to lead them to confrontation and posssibly to military 
conflict. 
Second, four-plus-two includes all of the countries with the most 
important relationships with the DPRK. If any one country were to be 
left out, North Korea could still try to play that country against the 
others, but with all of the most interested and influential countries 
included, the circle of influence on the DPRK is truly closed. However, 
the US wants to use the multilateral forum for a different purpose: to 
close the circle coercively on the DPRK and to force North Korea to 
accept its terms—all ‘sticks’.  
By ‘closing the circle’, I mean something quite different. The key 
point is to demonstrate unequivocably to North Korea that there is a 
consensus among the five other states both that the DPRK must give up 
its nuclear weapons capability and accept verification, and that, in 
return, the group accepts North Korea’s concerns about security and 
development as legitimate, and is prepared to make appropriate com-
mitments to achieve them. The solution requires the right combination 
of both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’.  
Finally, a multilateral approach can provide a much higher proba-
bility that once an agreement is concluded, it can be successfully 
sustained. As already discussed, both the US and the DPRK accuse the 
other of failing to fulfill the commitments they made before under the 
earlier Agreed Framework. Moreover, the Bush Administration has 
earned a reputation during its brief time in office for playing what is 
called ‘bait and switch’: making a commitment to another party in order 
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to gain something in return, but then failing to do what you had 
promised to do.17 In a multilateral arrangement such as the one pro-
posed here, it is assumed that all parties have a substantial interest in 
assuring that the others honour the commitments that they have made. 
Multilateral pressure can help to ensure that no consortium member 
plays bait and switch.  
CONCLUSION 
All of the US bilateral options have serious problems: a) the use of 
military force could result in a horrific retaliatory attack by the North on 
Seoul, on US military forces, and possibly on Japan;18 b) heavy 
economic sanctions are opposed by Japan, South Korea and China and 
could result in economic collapse of the North, flooding the region with 
tens of thousands of refugees;19 and c) to negotiate bilaterally an offer 
of aid in return for a promised denuclearisation deal with Pyongyang 
would be criticised by hardliners as repeating Clinton’s earlier 
‘appeasement’ of North Korea. Moreover, the Bush Administration is 
seeking some sort of face-saving multilateral format for resolving the 
crisis to avoid being charged with caving in to North Korean ‘nuclear 
blackmail’. 
Why would four-plus-two be preferable for the US? It would be the 
multilateral solution demanded by Washington and would thereby help 
defend the Administration from its domestic critics. More significant for 
the US, four-plus-two would not only deal with the immediate DPRK 
nuclear issue but would also put in place a long-term arrangement that 
has the potential to bring peace and stability to a volatile region in 
which the US has important interests. Four-plus-two would not be 
simply a strategic bandaid like the earlier Agreed Framework. Finally, it 
could provide a precedent for multilateral security cooperation more 
broadly in the East Asian region, which could help to alleviate the 
widespread concerns there about possible unilateral US actions either to 
intervene or to withdraw from the region. 
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An additional benefit for all parties would be that participation in 
such a security consortium would allow Japan (the only non-nuclear-
weapons power of the four) to become a much more active and 
influential player, a major power in its geographical region of highest 
priority without going nuclear. Such a security consortium might well 
assist Japan to participate strategically as what Ozawa Ichiro would call 
a ‘normal nation’.20 A further benefit for Japan would be that four-plus-
two could set a precedent for strategic cooperation in the region, which 
might facilitate, for example, the completion of Russo–Japanese nego-
tiations for a peace treaty to formally end the hostilities of the Second 
World War. 
In its negotiations with the DPRK, the United States needs a firm 
commitment of support by all four of the other countries in order to 
achieve a peaceful solution. A bilateral, US–DPRK agreement is most 
unlikely to work because of the absolute distrust between the two 
governments. Just as North Korean commitments to the US are not 
credible because of past violations by the DPRK,21 American promises 
to the DPRK are not believed for the same reason. They are two 
‘realist’governments playing a ‘zero-sum’ game.  
Moreover, unrelenting pressure will be needed to convince the 
DPRK to do what it fundamentally does not want to do: to give up the 
nuclear programs that Pyongyang believes, in its ‘self-help’ security 
strategy, to be the best deterrent to a possible military attack by the 
United States. That pressure can only be imposed by closing the circle 
of influence on the DPRK through including all of its major sources of 
outside support. 
At the same time, however, China, Russia and South Korea will not 
commit to a unilaterally imposed solution by the United States (as we 
have seen in their unwillingness to join Washington’s Proliferation 
Security Initiative) that fails to include sufficient incentives to meet 
Pyongyang’s minimum security and development requirements. 
Coercive diplomacy alone will not suffice. The other parties insist that 
there must be both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to achieve a peaceful solution 
to the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
Finally, in the proposed Northeast Asian security consortium, the 
other four parties would in effect serve as guarantors to both the DPRK 
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and the US that the deal, once made, will stick—because it will be in 
their collective interest to make it work. In that sense, the four in 
combination have the power to frustrate either side from prevailing. 
They know that they cannot let either the US or North Korea have their 
own way, or there will be no peaceful solution to the crisis. Earlier, the 
Bush Administration might not have been willing to agree to a 
cooperative security solution to the crisis, but as the coalition in Iraq 
continues to fail even to maintain security in that country, and the US 
becomes militarily and financially more overextended, the Bush leader-
ship has begun to appear more willing to listen to its five other four-
plus-two negotiating partners. 
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